The World Is Bigger Than Five: UN Security Council Reform, Gaza Diplomacy and the COP31 Agenda

Türkiye's Position

Ankara says its thesis is not simply about Türkiye having a seat but about the principle that global decisions should not depend on five states. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeated the phrase “The world is bigger than five” in successive speeches at the UN General Assembly, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has set out Türkiye's reform position within the UfC framework.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

• Critique of the veto structure. According to President Erdoğan's UN General Assembly addresses, a Council in which a single permanent member can block collective action cannot deliver global justice or credible conflict prevention. The legal basis Ankara cites is the principle of sovereign equality of all members in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, set against the veto in Article 27(3).
• No new permanent seats; more representation. The Turkish MFA's published position, aligned with the Uniting for Consensus group, supports a larger Council with more elected members, longer terms and re-eligibility. Ankara argues this is more democratic than adding permanent members and is consistent with Article 23 on equitable geographical distribution.
• Working methods and accountability. Ankara supports more transparency in the Council, stronger Council–General Assembly relations and the Assembly's debate-after-veto mechanism (resolution 76/262), which it sees as an incremental way to make veto use answerable.
• Structural bias example: Cyprus. Ankara argues that UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), which treated the Greek Cypriot administration as the “Government of Cyprus” after the 1963 breakdown of the 1960 partnership order, shows how Council decisions can entrench status asymmetries. See Cyprus: The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the Sovereign Equal Two-State Solution.
• Practice over rhetoric. Türkiye points to its mediation record, including the 2022 Istanbul arrangements behind the Black Sea Grain Initiative (more than 33 million tons of grain moved to global markets, per Ankara), as evidence that middle powers can fill gaps left by a deadlocked Council. See The Montreux Convention, Black Sea Security and Türkiye's Mediation.

Other states see the question differently. G4 and African Union members argue that opposing new permanent seats freezes an unrepresentative status quo, and some P5 members reject limits on their own veto. Türkiye's counter-argument is that reform which creates more permanent privilege would widen, not narrow, the legitimacy gap.

Gaza and Palestine

Ankara uses the Council's record on Gaza as a case study. Between October 2023 and early 2024 the United States vetoed several draft resolutions calling for a ceasefire or humanitarian pause, and in March 2024 Russia and China vetoed a US draft; Resolution 2728, demanding a ceasefire for Ramadan, passed on 25 March 2024 with the US abstaining. Türkiye has called for an immediate ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access and a two-state settlement based on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, a position consistent with its 1988 recognition of Palestine. President Erdoğan has also offered Türkiye as a guarantor in any future arrangement and Ankara has announced it would join the case brought by South Africa at the International Court of Justice. Israel and the United States dispute aspects of these positions, and Israel rejects accusations of violating international law.

Africa and the Horn of Africa

Türkiye has been an observer to the African Union since 2005 and was declared a strategic partner in 2008. It has hosted or co-hosted partnership summits in 2008, 2014 and 2021 and expanded its diplomatic network across the continent. President Erdoğan's 2011 visit to Mogadishu during famine opened a long-term engagement in Somalia, covering aid, infrastructure and training. In December 2024, Türkiye mediated the “Ankara Declaration” between Somalia and Ethiopia over maritime access. Ankara frames Africa's absence from permanent Council seats as a prime example of why reform is needed.

The Gulf and the Organization of Turkic States

In the Gulf, Ankara cites its strategic dialogue with the Gulf Cooperation Council (since 2008), its security cooperation with Qatar and a 2023 leaders' tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE as evidence of a diversified diplomacy. In the Turkic world, the Turkic Council founded in 2009 became the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2021, with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan as members and Turkmenistan and Hungary as observers; the Turkish Cypriot State was granted observer status in 2022. Ankara presents the OTS as a model of regional cooperation within the UN framework, not an alternative to it.

Climate diplomacy: Zero Waste and COP31

The Zero Waste Initiative, launched in 2017 under the patronage of Emine Erdoğan, led to a UN High-Level Advisory Board on Zero Waste and to General Assembly resolution 77/161 (December 2022), which created the International Day of Zero Waste on 30 March. Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in October 2021 and announced a net-zero target for 2053. At COP30 in Belém in November 2025, parties accepted an arrangement under which Türkiye hosts COP31 in Antalya in November 2026 and holds the presidency, while Australia leads the negotiations track and a pre-COP is held in the Pacific. Ankara presents this as a practical contribution to a more inclusive global agenda. Critics point out that Türkiye's coal reliance and emissions growth will be scrutinized.